米MicrosoftでCopilotなどを担当するチャールズ・ラマンナ氏は11月16日、4日前に発生したMicrosoft 365の大規模障害の原因をXで公表した。7月に配信を始めた修正プログラムに潜んでいた不具合が、負荷の増加と処理能力の低下が重なったことで表面化した。最も深刻な時点では、Microsoft 365の接続を受け付けるゲートウェイのサーバーの8割超が応答しなくなったという。
ラマンナ氏によれば、原因は大きく3つだ。
1つ目は、ゲートウェイ専用の修正プログラムに、特定の負荷がかかるとサーバーの内部処理が滞る不具合があったこと。
2つ目は、障害の約15時間前にTeamsの通信経路を切り替えたことで、ゲートウェイへの負荷が増えたこと。Microsoft 365には2系統の通信経路があり、Teamsの通信を別の経路からExchange Onlineも利用する経路に切り替えた結果、通信量や通信のパターンが変化した。
3つ目は、別の問題により、ゲートウェイのサーバーの処理能力が約14%低下していたことだ。
これら3つの要因が重なったことで、これまで表面化していなかった不具合が引き起こされた形になった。
応答しなくなったサーバーへの通信は、通常どおり稼働中のサーバーに振り替えられた。だが、振り替え先にも同じ不具合があり、負荷が移るたびに停止が連鎖した。影響を地域などの単位で食い止める仕組みも別の問題で機能せず、世界規模に広がった。TeamsやOneDriveなどは問題のゲートウェイを回避できたため先に回復したが、Exchange Onlineは同じ方法を取れず、復旧に時間がかかったという。
さらに復旧作業でも、サーバーを戻すと待機していた通信が集中し、再び応答しなくなる問題が起きた。Microsoftはサーバーをグループごとに切り離し、問題の箇所を以前の正常な状態に戻す修正を適用して、順に再稼働させた。同社はすでにサイバー攻撃やAIエージェントが原因ではないと説明しており、最終報告は同じ週のうちに公表する予定だとしている。
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below. We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations. The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services. First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments. The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact. Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores. Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts. Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own. Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States. When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive. Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally. Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway. Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change. After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region). The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
— Charles Lamanna (@clamanna) November 16, 2026
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